We use data from the PSID to investigate how households'portfolio allocations change in response to wealth ‡uctuations. Persistent habits, consumption commitments, and subsistence levels can generate time-varying risk aversion with the consequence that when the level of liquid wealth changes, the proportion a household invests in risky assets should also change in the same direction. In contrast, our analysis shows that the share of liquid assets that households invest in risky assets is not a¤ected by wealth changes. Instead, one of the major drivers of households'portfolio allocation seems to be inertia: households rebalance only very slowly following in ‡ows and out ‡ows or capital gains and losses.
Introduction
A growing number of studies in macroeconomics and …nance propose models in which agents' relative risk aversion is time-varying. The most popular approach is to use habit-formation preferences, in particular di¤erence habits, which imply that felicity is a function of consumption minus a habit. In asset pricing, di¤erence-habit models have some success in reproducing the mean and counter-cyclicality of asset return risk premia found in the data (Constantinides (1990) ; Bakshi and Chen (1996) ; Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ). In macroeconomics, habits help to jointly match stylized facts about asset returns and the business cycle (see, e.g., Jermann (1998) ; Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) ). An alternative approach focuses on consumption commitments, which can have e¤ects similar to those of di¤erence habits, in particular, similar timevariation in relative risk aversion (Chetty and Szeidl (2005) ).
While habit preferences 1 seem to help in matching aggregate data, little is known yet about whether the predictions of habit-formation models also …t with microdata. Mehra and Prescott (2003) , for example, point out that it is not clear whether investors actually have the huge time varying counter-cyclical variations in risk aversion postulated by models like Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . One of the key implications of di¤erence habits is that individuals'relative risk aversion should vary with wealth, in contrast to models with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). An increase in wealth, for example, should lead to a temporary decrease in relative risk aversion. This is an important, but so far untested prediction. In this paper, we provide evidence on this question from microdata on how households allocate their wealth between risky and riskless assets.
To clarify the implications of di¤erence habits for asset allocation, we start by studying a simple discrete-time model of portfolio choice. The issues are most transparent if we take the view that with CRRA preferences-i.e., without habit-the investor would have su¢ ciently low risk aversion so that she would invest most of her liquid wealth in risky assets. If we now introduce a di¤erence habit, this increases the desire to hold riskless assets. Their primary role is to provide su¢ cient …nancial resources to ensure that future consumption can always be kept above the level of the habit. Hence, optimal riskless asset holdings are tied to the slow-moving habit level and thus relatively …xed. But liquid wealth ‡uctuates, due to capital gains, income, and consumption. As a result, when liquid wealth increases, the optimal share of risky assets in the liquid wealth portfolio increases, and vice versa. E¤ectively, relative risk aversion varies with wealth.
We test this prediction with household-level panel data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), covering a period of about 20 years. We …rst examine how changes in liquid wealth a¤ect stock market participation. We …nd that changes in liquid wealth have a signi…cant positive e¤ect on the probability of stock market entry and a negative e¤ect on the probability of exit. While this is consistent with timevarying risk aversion if there are some …xed per-period cost of participation, similar e¤ects also arise with CRRA preferences. Thus, these tests cannot discriminate between habit models and models with CRRA preferences. Unlike for the participation decision, we …nd that changes in liquid wealth essentially play no role in explaining changes in asset allocation for households that participate in the stock market. We regress the change in proportion of liquid assets invested in risky assets on the change in liquid wealth and …nd that the positive e¤ect predicted by di¤erence-habit models is absent. If anything, the e¤ect is slightly negative (but economically tiny). This is not the result of low statistical power-our coe¢ cients are quite precisely estimated. Thus, the asset allocation results favor the CRRA model.
Our regressions control for a broad set of household characteristics, including variables related to the life-cycle and time dummies to eliminate aggregate e¤ects and focus on cross-sectional variation. We also pay attention to measurement error. We obtain similar results when we instrument changes in wealth with independently measured income growth and inheritances, albeit with somewhat lower precision. Moreover, we also show, theoretically, that it doesn't matter whether the liquid wealth change is anticipated, as long as the anticipated change is not entirely riskless. What matters is that optimal riskless asset holdings are relatively …xed in the short-run, because they are tied to the habit level, and thus any ‡uctuation in current liquid wealth, whether previously anticipated or not, leads to a change in the risky asset share.
One possible explanation for the lack of a contemporaneous e¤ect of wealth changes on asset allocation is that households' asset allocation is governed by inertia. When capital gains and losses arise, they are not rebalanced, and when in-and out ‡ows arise, they a¤ect mostly the riskless asset (cash) balances. With infrequent or delayed adjustment, the …rst e¤ect would lead to a positive, the latter e¤ect to a negative relationship between changes in liquid wealth and the liquid risky asset share. Indeed, we …nd that inertia seems to be the dominant factor determining changes in asset allocation. The PSID data on purchases and sales of risky assets allows us to reconstruct, approximately, how the portfolio allocation would look like if households had not bought or sold risky assets between successive interview dates (assuming that all in-and out ‡ows a¤ect only cash balances). We …nd that actual portfolio allocations are quite close. The data on purchases and sales are surely noisy and probably a¤ected by forgotten trades, but the strength of the inertia e¤ect seems to be too big to be just the result of measurement error.
Given that there seems to be strong inertia, we then check whether a positive e¤ect of liquid wealth changes on portfolio shares might appear if we allow for slow adjustment. We regress future changes in the risky asset share on past changes in wealth and …nd a small positive e¤ect. But in terms of economic magnitudes it is again a very small e¤ect, and it is statistically weak.
Taken together, our …ndings suggest that relative risk aversion does not vary with wealth changes in the way postulated by habit-formation models. The large variations in relative risk aversion induced by wealth changes that these theories predict are evidently absent from microdata. At least with respect to the relationship between asset allocation and wealth, our evidence suggests that constant relative risk aversion is a good description of microeconomic behavior. But the CRRA model cannot explain the large inertia in households'portfolio shares either.
Our evidence on household asset allocation ties in well with some recent work that …nds it hard to reconcile habit preferences and microdata along other dimensions of households' economic choices. Dynan (2000) …nds no evidence that householdlevel consumption growth exhibits the patterns predicted by internal habit-formation models. Gomes and Michaelides (2003) study a life-cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice and …nd that the introduction of habit formation makes it more di¢ cult to match empirical regularities in microdata. A recent paper by Sahm (2006) examines relative risk aversion measures elicited from responses to hypothetical gamble questions in the Health and Retirement Study and …nds no e¤ect of wealth changes on changes in relative risk aversion. The …ndings in these studies contrast with Lupton (2003) who …nds a negative relationship between past consumption levels and current risky asset holdings, including businesses and real estate, which he argues is consistent with habit formation, and Ravina (2005) , who …nds support for habit formation in credit card purchases data. The results in our (…rst-di¤erences) regressions are also consistent with earlier evidence that the cross-sectional relationship between the level of the risky asset share (Heaton and Lucas (2000) ; Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2003) ) or elicited relative risk aversion measures (Barksy, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) ) and the level of wealth is essentially ‡at among households that participate in the stock market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple portfolio choice model with habit preferences, our methodology, and the data. Section 3 reports our main results. In Section 4 we discuss the implications of our results.
Theory and Methodology

Model of Asset Allocation with Habits
We develop a simple model of portfolio choice that illustrates how relative risk aversion can be time-varying when agents' preferences exhibit di¤erence habits, subsistence levels, or similar features. Let time be discrete and consider a single agent with in…nite horizon. The agent's wealth at time t is denoted W t and is measured before time t consumption, C t . There are two securities the agent can invest in: a risky asset, with return R t and a riskfree asset with constant return R f . At time t the agent chooses C t and the proportion of W t C t invested in the risky asset, t , to solve the problem
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
where is the subjective discount factor, is the curvature of the felicity function, R p;t+1 t (R t R f ) + R f is the return on the investors'liquid wealth portfolio, and X is the habit. Consumption paths with C t X at some future t with non-zero probability are assigned in…nitely negative utility. We assume that risky asset returns have a log-normal distribution. Because we focus on cross-sectional di¤erences between households and not on aggregate variation, we also assume, for simplicity, constant expected returns and constant volatility.
In our basic discussion we assume that X is constant. This should be thought of as an approximation to a model in which X varies slowly. In the appendix we show that our basic model can be viewed as an approximation to an internal habit model along the lines of Constantinides (1990) , where habit responds sluggishly to past consumption. As Campbell and Cochrane (1999) point out, letting the habit level respond slowly, over several years, to changes in consumption is necessary to match empirical features of asset returns, such as a highly persistent price-dividend ratio, persistent volatility, and long-run forecastability of returns, and so we focus on the e¤ects of such slow moving habits in our analysis. Alternatively, X could represent an external habit that does not depend on the action of our single agent, a constant subsistence level, or the cash- ‡ow stream required to …nance future committed consumption along the lines of Chetty and Szeidl (2005) .
We solve the agent's problem by rede…ning consumption and wealth such that the objective and the budget constraint map into a standard CRRA problem, for which we know the relevant properties of the solution. De…ne surplus wealth W t W t X R f X and surplus consumption C t C t X. We can rewrite the maximization problem as
Now assume that the investor at time t invests a fraction t of W t C t X R f into the risk asset, and the rest in the riskless asset. This surplus portfolio yields a return R p;t+1 t (R t R f ) + R f . The remaining X R f dollars are invested in the riskless asset. Without further restrictions on t , this decomposition of the wealth portfolio into two components is without loss of generality. The budget constraint now becomes
from which we obtain
Thus, our problem maps into the problem of a CRRA investor with wealth W t , consumption C t , and risky asset portfolio share t . If expected returns and volatility are constant, t = , i.e., it is constant, as we know from Samuelson (1969) . Then the risky asset share of our habit utility investor, as a fraction of post-consumption wealth at time t, is
We now see that t is increasing in W t , holding X constant. The agent invests the present value of the future habit, X=R f , in riskless assets, and surplus wealth over and above that amount like a CRRA investor. Hence, if W t is close to X=R f , the agent's e¤ective relative risk aversion is high, because most of the wealth is used to self-insure the stream of future habit. If W t is a lot larger than X=R f , the agent invests approximately like a CRRA investor. So far, the agent's wealth is composed entirely liquid wealth, by which we mean the sum of stocks and riskless bonds. In a more realistic model, however, the household would also have so-called background wealth, i.e., labor income, housing wealth, and perhaps wealth in a private business. Labor income and business ownership are sources of risky income. Home equity represents a risky asset if the household expects to sell at some point, say at retirement (or trade to a house of di¤erent size, or in a di¤erent location).
2 The presence of background wealth complicates the relationship between liquid wealth levels, habit, and the proportion of liquid wealth allocated to stocks, because , and hence also t , depend on how much background wealth the agent has, and on the riskiness of background wealth. This makes the portfolio choice problem quite untractable.
Fortunately, the existing literature shows that as long as the returns on background wealth have a relatively low correlation with stock returns (for which there is some empirical support), the main e¤ect of risky background wealth is a diversi…cation e¤ect. That is, the presence of background wealth allows the household to diversify away some of the risks of stocks, reducing the aversion to holding stocks.
3 This diversi…cation e¤ect can simplify the problem.
2 Costs of adjusting the holdings of illiquid background wealth can also lead to an additional e¤ect of house ownership that relates to one of the possible interpretations of X. Recognizing that housing is often …nanced by collateralized borrowing (mortgage), and that many households own a house for most of their life, one can view housing as a long-lived durable good to which the household has committed …nancial resources of future periods, and whose consumption is very costly to adjust. In this case, the mortgage payments have the same consequences as a habit. The agent uses riskless assets to self-insure and be able to meet future mortgage payments to avoid large adjustment costs of trading down to a smaller house. This e¤ect is analyzed in Chetty and Szeidl (2005) and X can be viewed as incorporating the e¤ects of habits and of such committed future payments.
3 It's important to distinguish here between models that examine the e¤ect of adding mean-zero
The very purpose of habit-formation models is to try to explain facts about asset returns and consumption with moderate values for the felicity curvature parameter . For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) set = 2 and the habit is responsible for the lion's share of e¤ective relative risk aversion and its variation over time; the curvature of the felicity function would induce very little relative risk aversion in the absence of the habit. For such moderate values of , realistically calibrated models of household portfolio choice with CRRA preferences and background wealth, such as Bertaut and Haliassos (1995) , Heaton and Lucas (1997) , Cocco (2004) , Cocco, Maenhout, and Gomes (2005) , and Yao and Zhang (2005) all …nd that households should basically invest 100% of their liquid wealth in stocks. In other words, = 1. Note also that 100% is the upper bound (i.e., no leverage) for the allocation to risky assets in discrete time if background wealth is risky (in the sense that there is a strictly positive probability that background wealth can fall to an arbitrarily small value over the next period).
These results suggest that we can incorporate the e¤ects of housing wealth and labor income into our model by approximating 1, i.e., by assuming that a CRRA investor without habit would invest about 100% of his liquid wealth in stocks. By making this approximation, we e¤ectively assume that the habit does most of the lifting required to get risky asset shares below 100% in our portfolio choice model. This is eminently consistent with the spirit of habit-formation equilibrium models where the habit does most of the lifting to get a sizeable equity risk premium.
The bene…t of this approximation is that the optimal portfolio share no longer depends on background wealth and that it varies over time only because of variation in
, not because of variation in :
Eq. (7) provides the basis for the main tests in the paper. The analyses where we assume 1 should be interpreted as a test of the joint hypothesis that habits lead to time-variation in risky asset shares and that the variation induced by habits dominates the e¤ects of variation in background risks.
But we also examine alternative speci…cations where we relax the 1 assumption. Allowing for a range of values that are still relatively close to one, say 0:9 1, would make little di¤erence as long as variation in
is instead substantially smaller than one, we have to take into account that a changing composition of wealth can change the degree to which stock market risk is diversi…ed away in background wealth. We relax the 1 approximation in two heuristic ways.
background risks (e.g., Gollier and Pratt (1996) ) from the portfolio choice literature that's our focus here, where background wealth is added, which has positive mean returns.
First, when we look at the liquid risky asset share, we control for the relative magnitude of background wealth. We use the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio, which should help capture variation in . In the end, we …nd that these controls have little e¤ect. This is consistent with cross-sectional analyses in the literature. Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Yao and Zhang (2005) …nd little evidence that these asset composition ratios are correlated with liquid risky asset shares (among households that participate in the stock market), perhaps with the exception of the relative share of business wealth, which seems to have some small negative impact. These empirical …ndings also support our approximation assumption 1. Second, we look at the …nancial wealth (liquid plus housing plus business wealth) risky asset share. On the right-hand side of Eq. (6) one then also has to rede…ne W t as …nancial wealth. The only background wealth component left is human wealth, which is di¢ cult to measure. We include the labor income/…nancial wealth ratio interacted with age as a proxy for background human wealth.
Implications for Time-variation in Risky Asset Holdings
We are interested in the implications of habit formation for time-variation in the willingness to hold risky assets. To obtain our estimating equation, we …rst linearize Equation (7),
where x log(X=R f ), w t log (W t C t ) 4 , and the last approximate equality follows from a …rst-order Taylor approximation, where and are constants, and > 0. Intuitively, when W t is close to X, changes in W t have a big e¤ect on X=W t at the margin, but the e¤ect is small when W t is big. This feature is preserved by linearizing around the log habit-wealth ratio, such that t is linear in log liquid wealth, so that the bigger W t , the smaller the marginal impact of an increase in W t .
Taking …rst di¤erences of equation (8), we get This result depends on our assumption that X is approximately constant. As discussed above, it can be justi…ed, for example, by looking at idiosyncratic wealth shocks and X as an external habit that is not a¤ected by idiosyncratic wealth shocks, or with X as an internal habit that is slowly moving, and so reacts only very sluggishly to changes in wealth. Eq. (9) forms the basis for our empirical tests. Anticipated vs. unexpected wealth changes-When taking our model to the data, an important question is whether the relationship between changes in liquid wealth and portfolio shares would be modi…ed if changes in liquid wealth are partly anticipated. It turns out that this distinction does not matter for the validity of our tests.
Consider the following example. At t = 1, the agent expects to receive a big onetime payment, for example an inheritance from a rich uncle, in period t = 2. Let's assume that the probability of getting the inheritance is high, and the risk of obtaining or not obtaining it (for example, because the uncle prefers to donate the money to charity) and the value of the uncle's assets are uncorrelated with stock market returns. The key point is that a small probability of not getting the inheritance is su¢ cient to make the anticipated inheritance unsuitable as a means to insure future habit. Hence, at t = 1, the agent still needs to invest X R f in riskless assets to insure future habit, despite the anticipated inheritance. Only when the inheritance is actually received at t = 2, but not before, liquid wealth increases relative to
, and the risky asset share increases.
In this example, the dollar amount of stock holdings moves one-for-one with realized changes in the dollar amount of liquid wealth, despite the fact that the agent anticipated the change in liquid wealth. One can show that a similar logic applies when the agent invests less than 100% of surplus wealth in stocks, and with non-constant, but slow-moving habits, and when one incorporates the consumption-savings decision. In Appendix A.2 we numerically solve a three-period model that illustrates these e¤ects.
5
In summary, it is not crucial for our tests to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated changes in liquid wealth. What we need to control for, however, is that portfolio shares of risky assets and wealth may have some common predictable life-cycle pattern, for reasons unrelated to habit. But this is a di¤erent issue that we address below.
Stock market participation-In the model above, the agent would always participate in the stock market ( t > 0), because the optimal investment policy ensures that
(given su¢ cient initial wealth W 0 ). However, if one extended the model 5 It may be useful at this point to draw an analogy to the consumption literature. Power utility implies a precautionary savings motive. In that case, consumers faced with an expectation of a big in ‡ow in the near future, but which can be low or zero with strictly positive probability would hesitate to run down savings to raise today's consumption, because that would expose them to a small, but signi…cant risk that consumption might be extremely low in the future if the anticipated in ‡ow does not realize (Zeldes (1989 ), Carroll (1997 ). In other words, consumption displays "excess" sensitivity to anticipated changes in income. In the same way, an investor with habit preferences faced with an anticipated in ‡ow is deterred from increasing the risky asset share by a possibly very small probability that this in ‡ow might not realize. As a consequence, the portfolio share does not react until the income is realized, as long as there is some residual uncertainty about this income change. and allowed for some costs of participating in the stock market, the household might choose non-participation (see, e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) , Gomes and Michaelides (2005) ). These costs might be of …nancial nature, they could be opportunity costs of time and attention, and also psychological costs.
Suppose one extended the model to include a …xed per-period participation costs. Then, changes in liquid wealth could induce stock market entry or exit. For example, a household experiencing a negative change in wealth might choose to exit. This happens for two reasons. The …rst is that with a lower amount of wealth, the bene…ts from investing in stocks are smaller relative to the …xed level of costs. This e¤ect would arise even with CRRA preferences. Second, in the model with habit, as liquid wealth declines, the agent wants to invest a smaller amount of the shrunken liquid wealth in stocks, further reducing the bene…ts from participating.
The latter e¤ect suggests that the presence of habits could lead to time-varying stock market participation. We therefore also look at the empirical relationship between changes in liquid wealth and stock market entry and exit. But it's important to keep in mind that this is only a …rst step. A …nding that stock market participation varies with changes in liquid wealth will, on its own, not be su¢ cient to discriminate between CRRA and the habit model.
Econometric Issues
In our data, we have observations on wealth and asset holdings at dates that are k = 5 years or k = 2 years apart, depending on the subsample. Therefore, we rewrite Eq. (9) as k t = k w t , where k denotes a k-period …rst-di¤erence operator, k y t y t y t k .
To arrive at our estimating equation, we must take into account that variables outside of the model may cause common movements in the level of liquid assets and the risky asset share. For example, it is possible that both t and w t have some correlated deterministic pattern over the life-cycle. Therefore, we condition on a vector q t k of household characteristics that should capture such patterns, if present. It includes variables that are either constant or known at t k, and a vector of ones. In addition, most of our Speci…cations also include k h t , a vector of variables that capture major changes in family composition or asset ownership that could lead to preference shifts that are possibly correlated with k w t . Finally, we add a mean-zero error term " t , which captures unobserved forces on the portfolio share that are outside of the model and that are uncorrelated with k w t , q t k , and k h t . Thus, our estimating equation is
To reduce clutter, we continue to omit household subscripts. In our basic speci…cation, we assume that w t is well-measured so that " t is uncorrelated with k w t and the other regressors and we can estimate Eq. (10) with ordinary least squares (OLS). Below we also consider violations of this assumption when w t and t are measured with error. Life-cycle e¤ects and preference shifters-Our conditioning variables in q t k include a broad range of variables related to the life-cycle, background, and the …nancial situation of the household at t k. For lack of a better name, we refer to them collectively as life-cycle controls. We include age and age 2 ; indicators for completed high school and college education, respectively, and their interaction with age and age 2 ; dummy variables for gender and their interaction with age and age 2 , marital status, health status; the number of children in the household, the number of people in the household; dummy variables for any unemployment in the k years leading up to and including year t k, and for coverage of the household head's job by a union contract. In addition, we include the log of the equity in vehicles owned by the household, log family income at t k 4, 2-year growth in log family income at t k and t k 2, and a variable for inheritances received in the k years leading up to and including year t k. The other category of control variables, labelled as preference shifters, k h t , includes changes in some household characteristics between t k and t: changes in family size, changes in the number of children, and a sets of dummies for house ownership, business ownership, and non-zero labor income at t and t k. The idea behind the house ownership dummies, for example, is that households might save for the purchase of a home with mostly riskless assets, experiencing increasing wealth over time, but when the home is purchased eventually, the holdings of riskless assets drop strongly (see, e.g., Faig and Shun (2002) ). The dummies at t and t k should absorb those e¤ects.
Idiosyncratic vs. aggregate wealth changes-Our partial equilibrium portfolio choice model deals with the decision of a single household, holding constant aggregate quantities and prices. But if a wealth change is common to all households, and hence they all want to change their exposure to risky assets, the e¤ect on asset allocation is dampened, because instead of quantity, it's now the price (and thus, the expected return) of risky assets that adjusts. To uncover the e¤ects of habits, we must therefore eliminate aggregate changes in wealth and asset holdings and focus on household-speci…c variation. For this reason, we include time …xed e¤ects in q it k , which e¤ectively demeans wealth changes and risky asset shares cross-sectionally. In Appendix A.3 we show that our estimator is consistent as the number of cross-sectional units N ! 1. In addition, we also recognize that there could be local e¤ects, where asset holdings and household income and other sources of wealth variation are tied to the local economy. To eliminate such local e¤ects as much as possible, we interact the year dummies with dummies for the four PSID geographical regions, which provides us with a set of year-region dummies.
Measurement error-Measurement error is a standard concern with microdata from surveys. We model measured wealth as e w t w t + u t , i.e. the sum of true wealth and a measurement error u t ,. which implies k e w t = k w t + k u t . We assume that measurement error is uncorrelated with true wealth. More precisely, we assume that Cov (u t+i ; w t ) = 0 for i = 1; 0; 1, so that Cov ( k u t ; k w t ) = 0: Let the measured risky asset share be e t = t + v t , with measurement error v t . Substituting wealth and the risky asset share into Eq. (10), we obtain
Measurement error renders OLS inconsistent because k e w t and the composite residual " t +v t k u t are correlated. First, Cov ( k e w t ; k u t ) > 0, which biases the coe¢ cient estimate for towards zero. Second, because the numerator (stocks) and denominator (stocks plus riskless assets) of t are made up by components of w t , we should also expect that Cov ( k e w t ; v t ) 6 = 0, which could also bias the sign of the coe¢ cient. Speci…cally, measurement error only in stock holdings would lead to Cov ( k e w t ; v t ) > 0, measurement error only in riskless assets would lead to Cov ( k e w t ; v t ) < 0. It is not possible to unambiguously sign the combined e¤ect when both stock holdings and riskless assets are mismeasured. Overall, the bias in the estimate of could go in either direction, depending on whether measurement error in stocks or riskless assets dominates.
To address the measurement error problem, we look for instrumental variables for k w t . The identi…cation requirement is that the instruments, z t , are (partially) correlated with k w t , but not with " t + v t k u t . Given such instruments, we can estimate consistently with two-stage least squares (TSLS). Our instruments are quantile dummies for income growth from t k to t (similar to Dynan (2000) in a di¤erent application), and inheritance receipts (as in Meer, Miller, and Rosen (2003) ) between t k and t. These instruments are based upon survey questions that are di¤erent from those for the components of w t . Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the elements of z t are uncorrelated with " t + v t k u t . Unfortunately, it is to be expected that we lose precision compared with the OLS estimator, and so there is a tradeo¤ between potential measurement-error bias and precision. A priori, it is not clear that the TSLS estimator will be closer to the true parameter in a mean-squared error sense. Therefore, we report both the OLS and TSLS results in our tests.
Data
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), obtained from the University of Michigan. It is a longitudinal study that tracks family units and their o¤spring over time. We use data on asset holdings collected in the years 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2001, and 2003 . Income data and many household characteristics are available annually until 1997, and every second year from then onwards. Appendix A.4 describes our data in more detail. Here we brie ‡y discuss the de…nition of the variables that we extract from the …les. To make magnitudes comparable over time, we de ‡ate all income and wealth data by the consumer price index (CPI) into December 2001 dollars.
Variable de…nitions-We de…ne liquid assets as the sum of holdings of stocks and mutual funds plus riskless assets, where we follow common practice and de…ne riskless assets as the sum of cash-like assets and holdings of bonds. Subtracting other debts, which comprises non-mortgage debt such as credit card debt and consumer loans, from liquid assets yields liquid wealth. We further denote the sum of liquid wealth, equity in a private business, and home equity as …nancial wealth.
We then calculate two risky asset shares: First, the sum of stocks and mutual funds held, divided by liquid assets (the liquid risky asset share).
6 Second, the sum of stocks and mutual funds, home equity, and equity in a private business, divided by …nancial wealth (the …nancial risky asset share).
As our income variable we use total family income. The inheritance variable included in the vector of household characteristics q t k is the value of inheritances received scaled by income to adjust for the fact that a given amount of inheritance has di¤erent relevance for households with di¤erent income and wealth. More precisely, we measure it as the log of one plus the value of the inheritance divided by family income at t k 4, in the k = 5 subsample, and t k 2 in the k = 2 subsample. 7 We want to use this variable as an instrument for liquid wealth, so we obviously cannot scale by wealth, and we scale by income instead.
In years when the wealth questions were administered, the PSID asked subjects to report on the amount of stocks and mutual funds bought and/or sold during the time since the previous wealth survey (i.e., in the 1989 wave for the time from 1984 to 1989). This information allows us to decompose the change in the amount of stocks and mutual funds held into an active investment/disinvestment component and a capital gains/losses component (see Appendix A.4 for details). There is reason to expect that this active investment information is noisy and that some households may systematically forget trades. We do not use the capital gains and active investment information in our main tests, only later when we examine inertia e¤ects. We discuss the measurement error issue at that point.
Sample selection and weighting-To be included in our sample, we require that the marital status of the family unit head remained unchanged from t k to t and that no assets were moved in or out as a consequence of a family member moving into or out of the family unit. We also exclude observations on households if the household head is retired at t. For risky asset shares to be meaningful, we also require a certain minimum level of wealth. We therefore exclude households with liquid wealth less than $10,000 or …nancial wealth less than $10,000 at t k. Overall, the data requirements are quite demanding. In many of our regressions we need observations on income at t k 2, and t k 4. This means that we need households that participate in many consecutive waves of the survey. We weight observations with PSID sample weights when we present summary statistics, but we do not use the sample weights in our regression analyses, because doing so would be ine¢ cient (Deaton (1997) , p. 70). In any case, as Appendix A.5 shows, weighted regressions produce similar results.
Summary statistics- Table 1 presents summary statistics. The two top panels show pooled cross-section/time-series statistics for all households that satis…ed the data and minimum lagged wealth requirements to be included in the sample. The two bottom panels show statistics for stock market participants, that is, those households that have stock holdings greater than zero at t and t k. We further report separate summary statistics for our 1984-1999 sample, for which the time-span between successive waves of the PSID with wealth information is k = 5 years, and the 1999-2003 sample, for which k = 2.
As the table shows, the proportion of households participating in the stock market is 45% in the 1984-1999 sample, and 58% in 1999-2003 . The large fraction of nonparticipants and the upward trend over time is roughly consistent with previous studies (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), but here the participation rate is somewhat higher because we focus on households that satisfy our minimum wealth requirements. The stock market entry variable in the two top panels is a dummy that is set to one for households that did not participate at t k and participate at t, and zero if the household does not hold stocks in t k and t. For households that participated in t k, the variable is set to missing (therefore the lower number of observations). The stock market exit variable is de…ned in similar manner. It is equal to one for participants in t k, but not t, zero for those that participated in t k and t, and missing otherwise. The numbers in the table show that there is considerable turnover in the group of participants. On average, between 34-35% of non-participants at t k enter the stock market until t, while about 19-24% of participants choose to exit. In our …rst tests below, we explore whether the probability of entry and exit is related to changes in liquid wealth.
Comparing wealth and income means and medians for all households and those for stock market participants, it is apparent that stock market participants have higher wealth and income on average. Combined with the fact that much of aggregate wealth is concentrated at the top end of the wealth distribution, wealthy households are, in some respects, the most important group of stock holders. Because extremely wealthy households have low response rates in surveys, they are not well represented in the PSID.
8 However, Juster, Smith, and Sta¤ord (1999) …nd that the wealth data in the 8 An additional concern is topcoding, where observations above a certain threshold are set to the PSID lines up well with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (which oversamples high income households and provides better data at the top end of the wealth distribution, but does not have a panel structure) at least up through the 98 th percentile of the wealth distribution. Hence, our data should give us a good picture of the asset allocation choices of wealthy households, except for the extremely wealthy. But it is also useful to keep in mind that for testing the habit formation theory it is not crucial to have data from the very top end of the wealth distribution, because the theory does not predict that households with moderate levels of wealth should behave di¤erently from households with very high levels of wealth. The distribution of wealth and income has strong positive skewness. But when we examine changes in wealth and income, we di¤erence logs. As the two bottom panels show, taking logs eliminates much of the skewness. The distribution of k-period di¤erences in log wealth and log income is roughly symmetric. The 10 th and 90 th percentiles show that the k-period changes in log wealth are substantial, in particular in the 1984-1999 period, where k = 5. The habit formation model predicts that these changes in wealth should give rise to changes in the risky asset share. As the statistics for the proportions of liquid and …nancial wealth invested in risky assets (%liq. assets risky and %…n. wealth risky) show, there is large variation in these risky asset shares over time. Whether these changes are related to wealth ‡uctuations is the subject of our main tests.
Results
Wealth Changes and Stock Market Participation
We start by investigating how changes in liquid wealth relate to stock market participation. There is existing evidence that higher wealth is associated with a higher probability that a household participates in the stock market (Bertaut and Haliassos (1995) ; Mankiw and Zeldes (1991); Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) ), but this evidence is cross-sectional and does not necessarily speak to the dynamic relationship between changes in wealth and entry and exit. It is also possible that levels of liquid wealth are correlated with some unobserved …xed household characteristics that cause participation. Di¤erencing removes the e¤ect of these household characteristics. Table 2 presents the results of probit regressions. In the …rst two columns, we estimate the probability of a household that did not participate at t k to enter the stock market until time t. In columns three and four we estimate the probability that a household that is participating at t k exits the stock market until t. The table shows threshold value to protect the identity of the household. But in the PSID these cuto¤s are very high ($10 million per wealth component until the late 1990s and $100 million subsequently) and a¤ect only a very small number of cases. the marginal e¤ects, that is, the e¤ect on the probability of entry or exit, evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. The regressions include all the preference shifters and life-cycle controls we mentioned in Section 2.3. The focus of our interest is on the coe¢ cient for the change in log liquid wealth.
As the table shows, in both samples (1984-1999 and 1999-2003) we …nd a positive coe¢ cient, with high statistical signi…cance. The point estimate of 0.124 in the …rst column implies that an increase in liquid wealth by 10% implies a roughly 1% increase in the probability to participate in the stock market. Hence, it is not a large e¤ect, but it's not negligible either. The exit regressions in columns three and four show that the probability of exiting the stock market is negatively related to changes in liquid wealth. The magnitudes of the point estimates are a little smaller than for the entry regressions, but they, too, are di¤erent from zero at a high level of statistical signi…cance. That changes in liquid wealth are signi…cantly related to stock market entry and exit also provides some reassurance on the measurement error issue. Evidently, measured changes in liquid wealth are not driven entirely by measurement noise, otherwise we wouldn't …nd a signi…cant relationship with stock market participation.
In summary, changes in liquid wealth appear to be one of the factors that causes changes in stock market participation. The reliably positive e¤ect we …nd is consistent with time-varying risk aversion due to wealth changes, but it is also consistent with CRRA preferences in a model with …xed per-period participation costs.
Wealth Changes and Asset Allocation
We now turn to our main tests, looking at changes in the risky asset share conditional on participation, i.e., for those households that participate in the stock market at t k and t. Our goal is to estimate Eq. (10), and we do so with OLS and TSLS.
First Stage- Table 3 presents the TSLS …rst-stage estimates. The instruments are two indicator variables for log income growth between t k and t below the 10 th or above the 90 th percentile (see Table 1 for the value of these percentiles). Furthermore, we include an instrument for whether the household reports to have received an inheritance between t k and t (see Section 2.4 for de…nition).
The results in the table show that the instruments have a signi…cant partial correlation with changes in log liquid wealth (columns 1 and 2) and changes in log …nancial wealth (columns 3 and 4) and the directions of the estimated e¤ects are reasonable: higher income growth and a higher inheritance are associated with higher growth in liquid and …nancial wealth. The partial R 2 of the instruments is between 0.01 and 0.02, which suggests that the instruments still leave a large fraction of variation in wealth changes unexplained. This is typical for microdata. Nevertheless, the instruments are jointly highly signi…cant, with p-values smaller than 0.005 for each of the Speci…cations. The F -statistics are, however, a bit lower than the rule of thumb of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) , below which the TSLS estimator is likely to have some bias towards the OLS estimator and size-distorted con…dence intervals due to weak instruments. 9 In Appendix A.5 we re-estimate our regressions with methods that are robust for weak instruments along the lines of Moreira (2003) and …nd similar point estimates, albeit with wider con…dence intervals.
Changes in liquid risky asset shares- Table 4 presents our main results. We regress changes in the liquid risky asset share on changes in liquid wealth. The habit model predicts that we should …nd a positive coe¢ cient, but as the table shows the point estimates are very close to zero. In fact, for the OLS estimate in column 1 for the 1984 1999 sample we can reject at conventional signi…cance levels that the coe¢ cient is greater than zero. However, economically the estimate is basically zero. The coe¢ cient of 0:013 in column 1 implies that 10% growth in real wealth leads to a tiny reduction in the share of risky liquid assets by 0:0013, e.g. from 50% to 49:87%. For the 1999 2003 sample, the estimate in column 4 is slightly positive, but again of tiny magnitude and statistically not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The low explanatory power of wealth changes is also underscored by the low R 2 in these regressions, where essentially none of the variables, including the controls, explains an economically signi…cant portion of changes in risky asset shares.
Having the two subsamples is useful, because they di¤er in the length of time between wealth measurement points. If habits are not su¢ ciently sluggish in catching up with consumption, having k = 5 years could be too long in the sense that there would be relatively quick mean reversion in risky asset shares, and so our regressions might not pick up much of the correlation with wealth changes. However, in the 1999 2003 subsample, we have k = 2 years, and we still …nd coe¢ cient estimates that are virtually zero economically. It is, of course, still possible that we miss habit e¤ects on the risky asset shares at even higher frequencies-but such high-frequency e¤ects cannot be those that drive the slow-moving variation in risky asset risk premia targeted by habit-formation asset pricing models.
In columns 2 and 5, we include asset composition controls: the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. The aim is to control for variations in background wealth. We still obtain almost identical coe¢ cients on changes in liquid wealth. This suggests that the results are not driven by some correlation of liquid wealth changes with changes in background risk exposure due to variation in the asset mix held by the household. Our results in di¤erences are consistent with earlier purely cross-sectional studies that have found a largely insigni…cant relationship between these asset composition ratios and the liquid risky asset share among stock market participants (Heaton and Lucas (2000) ; Yao and Zhang (2005) ).
The TSLS results in columns 3 and 6 show that measurement error does not appear to have a major in ‡uence on our results. Both estimates are negative and close to the OLS results, in particular for the 1984 1999 sample, but with higher standard error. The estimate for the 1999 2003 subsample is somewhat larger in magnitude, but that should not be overinterpreted, because the standard error is also much larger than with OLS. The table also reports p-values from an overidenti…cation test that show that we cannot reject that the instruments are valid (in the sense of being uncorrelated with the regression residual). Overall, the TSLS results do not provide any evidence that there is a signi…cant positive relationship between changes in liquid wealth and changes in the liquid risky asset share. Changes in …nancial risky asset shares-As an additional perspective on the issue of asset composition and background risk, Table 5 reports regressions similar to those in Table 4 , but with the …nancial risky asset share as dependent variable, and with changes in …nancial wealth as explanatory variable. This perspective would be appropriate if households with CRRA preferences would keep the proportion of …nancial wealth invested in risky assets, including home equity and business wealth, roughly constant. In that case, the presence of habit formation would imply that changes in …nancial wealth should lead to changes in the …nancial risky asset share.
As the table shows, however, this approach doesn't produce any evidence for a positive relationship between wealth changes and risky asset shares either. The coe¢ cients are all negative, for both subsamples, with OLS and TSLS, and with and without asset composition control (the asset composition controls here consist only of the labor income/…nancial wealth ratio interacted with age, as human wealth is the only remaining background wealth component that is not included in the risky asset share). The magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are larger than in Table 4 , and they are all signi…cantly smaller than zero. Thus, the evidence is not consistent with the predictions of the habit model.
Robustness checks-Appendix A.5 reports a large number of robustness checks. The results are generally similar to those in our main tests, so we just brie ‡y summarize here some of the variations in methodology that we explore. To check the sensitivity to the particular linearization in Eq. (8), we examine log and logit transformations of the risky asset shares. We also re-run our liquid risky asset share regressions accounting for leverage. We also …nd similar results when we weight observations with sample weights, and when we use a median regression estimator (which is not sensitive to outliers)
Inertia in Asset Allocation
One possible reason for the absence of a positive e¤ect of wealth changes on risky asset shares could be that the e¤ect is clouded by inertia. If an in-or out ‡ow of liquid wealth materializes …rst in the riskless asset category (e.g., cash), and households are slow to rebalance their portfolio, this can induce a negative contemporaneous relationship between liquid wealth changes and risky asset shares. Of course, capital gains and losses on risky assets have the opposite e¤ect: They lead to a positive contemporaneous relationship if the household is slow to rebalance.
The regressions reported in columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 show that both e¤ects are present. In that regression, we include a proxy for the risky asset return of the household between t and t k (for capital gains and losses, excluding dividends, to be precise), which we back out using the information on net purchases or sales of risky assets in the PSID. The risky asset return is strongly positively related to the liquid risky asset share, and changes in wealth have a more negative coe¢ cient compared with our earlier results in Table 4 , now that the risky asset return is included in the regression.
Estimating the degree of inertia-We now proceed to analyze in more detail how much inertia there is in portfolio allocations. We use the information on net purchases or sales of risky assets to construct a variable k Inert t : it represents the (counterfactual) change in the liquid risky asset share that the household would have experienced between t k and t under perfect inertia-that is, if it had not undertaken any purchases or sales of risky assets between t k and t. In this case, the risky asset position would have changed only because of capital gains and losses, and the riskless asset position would have changed only because of in-and out ‡ows (e.g., via cash or the checking account). We then modify our wealth regression, Equation (10), by including
If households exhibit perfect inertia, then the actual change in k t is equal to k Inert t , and therefore ' = 1. If households exhibit no inertia at all, and hence rebalance their portfolios immediately following capital gains and in ‡ows and out ‡ows of liquid wealth, then ' = 0. If households chase returns, in the sense that they buy more stocks following capital gains, then they exacerbate the e¤ect of capital gains and it is possible that ' > 1.
It is useful to keep in mind that purchases and sales of risky assets, and hence k Inert t , are likely to be measured with signi…cant error. In addition to the usual attenuation bias of classical errors-in-variables, the biggest concern is systematic underreporting of trades (forgotten trades). Households in the PSID are asked to recall the amount of purchases and sales over the last k years and it is plausible that they might forget some trades (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). In that case, part of the change in the value of liquid risky assets would be attributed wrongly to capital gains/losses instead of purchases/sales. This would lead to a spurious positive relationship between k Inert t and k t . We do not have instruments for household-speci…c capital gains and losses, so using instrumental variables is not feasible and measurement error remains a concern. We can do at least a weak check by comparing results for the …rst subsample, where the recall period is 5 years, with those for the second subsample, where the recall period is 2 years. Also, we can look at subsamples excluding the households that report no trades at all, which may be the most error-prone ones. Table 6 presents results from estimating Eq. (12) with OLS. As columns 2 and 5 show, the coe¢ cient on the inertia variable is large, around 0:75, with small standard errors. Taken at face value, it suggests that there is huge inertia. Households' asset allocations seem to ‡uctuate strongly as a function of in-and out ‡ows, and capital gains and losses, without much rebalancing taking place. The coe¢ cient on changes in liquid wealth is close to zero, as before. The R 2 is now around 0:70, which is huge compared with the small R 2 in Table 4 . But as we pointed out, it's possible that some of this e¤ect is driven by underreporting of trades. The magnitudes of the coe¢ cient estimates below, however, make it somewhat unlikely that this is the whole story. Underreporting would have to be extremely common to explain the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients we …nd.
To provide some perspective on the trade-reporting issue, columns 3 and 6 present regressions where we interact both the inertia variable and the liquid wealth changes variable with a dummy that we name Trade t . It takes a value of one if the household reported any net trade in risky assets for the period from t k to t and it is zero otherwise (the percentage of households that report to have traded is 59% in the 1984-1999 sample and 57% in the 1999-2003 sample). The coe¢ cient on k Inert t now picks up the e¤ect for those who don't trade (and the estimate is equal to one, not surprisingly), while the e¤ect for those who report trades can be obtained by adding the coe¢ cient on k Inert t and k Inert t Trade t , which yields about 0:65 in both subsamples. Thus, even for those that report trades, we still …nd a strong inertia e¤ect.
We also interact the Trade t variable with changes in liquid wealth, but as the table shows there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the wealth changes coe¢ cient between households that report trades and those that do not (the same is true if we exclude the inertia variable and its interaction with Trade t from this regression). Hence, the absence of a positive e¤ect of wealth changes on changes in risky asset shares at least is not driven by the subset of households that don't trade at all.
Allowing for slow adjustment to wealth changes-The …nding that there seems to be a lot of inertia in households'portfolio shares brings up the question whether there might actually be a positive e¤ect of wealth changes on risky asset shares, just with a time lag, because households need time to adjust, perhaps because they are trading o¤ the bene…ts of rebalancing towards the optimal risky asset share against transaction costs. In Table 7 we therefore investigate the e¤ect of wealth changes (between t k and t) on future changes in the risky asset shares (between t and t+k). The control variables are measured at the same points in time as earlier in Table 4 , with the exception of the preference shifters and the risky asset share, which are moved k periods into the future, i.e., measured between t and t + k. Regarding sample requirements, we now require that no assets had been moved out of the household due to a leaving family member, and marital status remained unchanged between t k and t + k, and we require stock market participation at t and t + k. Since we need a longer span of data for these regressions, we have a substantially lower number of observations than in Table 4 .
These regressions of k t+k on k w t are also interesting from a measurement-error perspective. The concern in the earlier regressions of k t on k w t in Table 4 is that measurement error in riskless asset holdings (if it dominates relative to the measurement error in risky asset holdings) might induce a spurious negative relationship between w t and t , and hence also between k t and k w t . However, for the regressions in Table 7 the situation is di¤erent: If measurement error induces a mechanical negative relationship between w t and t , it should lead to a spurious positive relationship between k t+k t+k t and k w t w t w t k . This is easiest to see with when measurement error is assumed to be uncorrelated over time, but it is also true with positively autocorrelated measurement error.
As Table 7 shows, the point estimates for the wealth e¤ect are indeed positive, and statistically signi…cant in the …rst subsample (1984 1999) but not in the second (1999 2003) . However, in terms of economic magnitudes, the coe¢ cient estimates are again close to zero and not much di¤erent from those in Table 4 . If we take the maximum coe¢ cient estimate (0:040, column 1) in the table, it suggests that an increase in liquid wealth by 10% leads to an increase in the risky asset share from 50% to 50:4%, which strikes us as a small e¤ect. Moreover, if one was concerned that the estimates in Table 4 might have a negative measurement error bias, then the estimates in Table 7 would have positive measurement error bias and would therefore overstate the e¤ect of wealth changes. 10 Overall, these results suggest that even if we allow for slow adjustment, there is no evidence for an economically signi…cant e¤ect of liquid wealth changes on risky asset shares.
Big vs. small changes-One possible explanation for inertia is that households face some …xed rebalancing cost. In that case, households would only want to rebalance if the bene…ts are large enough to outweigh the …xed rebalancing cost. From the perspective of the habit-formation model, this would imply that the household might be unwilling to rebalance following small wealth changes, but it might do so after big changes.
To …nd out, we examine piecewise-linear regressions, shown in Figure 1 . We run regressions similar to those in Table 4 , with the full set of controls (except the assetcomposition controls), and we use a spline for k w t . We set spline breakpoints at the quartiles of the distribution of k w t . Panel (a) in Figure 1 presents the …tted values, where we express k w t relative to its median and normalize such that the lines cross the origin. The range of values shown for k w t in the graph is about twice the di¤erence between the 75 th and 25 th percentile. We omit standard errors from the graph, but none of the slopes in the four segments is more than two standard errors from zero. As the …gure shows, in both the 1984-1999 and the 1999-2003 sample, the relationship between the liquid risky asset share and changes in liquid wealth is ‡at for small and large values of k w t . Hence, there is no support for the view that households might conform more closely to the predictions of the habit model when wealth changes are big and hence the bene…ts from rebalancing towards the optimal portfolio should be large. More generally, one can also ask whether households might exhibit less inertia after big in-/out ‡ows or big capital gains/losses. Again, with …xed rebalancing costs households might be reluctant to rebalance unless the asset allocation has moved su¢ ciently far away from the optimum. Therefore, Panel (b) in Figure 1 presents a piecewiselinear version of the regressions in column 1 and 3 of Table 6 . Spline breakpoints are now set at the quartiles of the distribution of k Inert t . Everything else, too, is similar to Panel (a), just with k Inert t replacing k w t . Standard errors are again omitted to reduce clutter, but they are small relative to the point estimates of the slope coe¢ cients (between 0:06 and 0:13 for the slope coe¢ cients in each of the four segments). The …gure shows that inertia is weaker when k Inert t is above the 75 th percentile, i.e., after big capital gains or following large out ‡ows. However, inertia is still relatively strong, and statistically still clearly di¤erent from zero.
That there is inertia even after big in-/out ‡ows or big capital gains/losses casts some doubt on the explanation that households are trading o¤ …xed rebalancing costs against bene…ts of rebalancing. It seems more likely that households simply do not pay close attention to their portfolio allocations. In other words, the costs of devoting any attention to the portfolio may be important, rather than actual costs of transacting.
Discussion
Summing up, our evidence shows that the e¤ect of wealth changes on households'asset allocation predicted by di¤erence-habit models is absent in microdata. The relationship between wealth and asset allocation seems best described by constant relative risk aversion. However, the large inertia we …nd isn't predicted by constant relative risk aversion models either-at least not without adding frictions.
Our focus in this paper is on understanding the microeconomics of household asset allocation. But beyond this microeconomic perspective, our results also raise some questions about models with habit-formation in asset pricing and macroeconomics. In di¤erence-habit asset-pricing models, variations in aggregate wealth over the business cycle generate large low-frequency variation in relative risk aversion and the relative demands for risky and riskless assets. However, the household-speci…c variation in wealth that we see in microdata seems rather large relative to business-cycle variation, and should therefore generate even larger household-speci…c variation in relative risk aversion and asset allocation. We don't …nd this variation in asset allocation in microdata.
To be clear, we cannot directly test the microeconomic implications of representative agent models like Campbell and Cochrane (1999) because it is not even clear how the microfoundations of these models would look like, except for some special cases with complete markets. However, notwithstanding this lack of explicit microfoundations, researchers often view the preferences of the representative agent in these models as being a plausible representation of the preferences of microeconomic agents. For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) motivate their choice of habit-formation preferences by pointing out that they are appealing from a psychological perspective, and, in particular, that the microeconomic predictions of external habits for consumption are plausible. Our …ndings with microdata cast doubt on the plausibility of such microeconomic stories for time-varying risk aversion.
Our …nding that wealth changes have some impact on stock market entry and exit suggests that changing stock market participation, rather than time-varying individual risk aversion, could perhaps play a role in the time-variation of risk premia in the aggregate. Wealth changes can induce changes in stock market participation even with CRRA preferences, if there are some per-period participation costs. But the e¤ect we …nd does not seem very strong, so it is somewhat questionable whether the magnitudes are big enough to have a signi…cant e¤ect in the aggregate.
Finally, the strong asset allocation inertia we …nd is an interesting and, so far, not well-understood phenomenon.
11 At a given point in time, a household's asset allocation depends to a large extent on the past history of capital gains/losses and in-/out ‡ows. Part of it may re ‡ect underreporting of risky asset purchases and sales in the PSID, but we doubt that such measurement error can explain the bulk of the apparent inertia, not least because similar inertia has also been found with data from 401(k) retirement accounts that do not have the same measurement error problems. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) , Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) , Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2004) , and Huberman and Sengmueller (2004) …nd that a large portion of individuals hardly ever trade at all in their retirement accounts, and that in ‡ow allocations are rarely changed.
One explanation could be that individuals are not willing to rebalance their portfolios because they perceive it as too costly. If so, it seems to be more a cost of giving any attention at all to the portfolio, rather than a …xed rebalancing cost in the form of explicit transaction costs, because we …nd that households are almost as reluctant to rebalance following large wealth changes as they are after small wealth changes.
In any case, slow adjustment of portfolio shares does not explain the absence of a wealth e¤ect on risky asset shares in our data, because wealth changes do not have an economically signi…cant e¤ect on future changes in risky asset shares either. 1984-1999) (1999-2003) (1984-1999) (1999-2003) Notes: Estimates are marginal e¤ects evaluated at sample averages of the explanatory variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 1984-1999) (1999-2003) (1984-1999) (1999-2003 Notes: Heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, p-values in brackets. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, p-values in brackets. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. . Notes: In addition to the spline terms for k w t or k Inert t , the regressions also contain the full set of control variables (Life-cycle controls, preference shifters, and year-region FE, as in Table 4 ). Spline breakpoints are set at quartiles for k w t or k Inert t , respectively. For the plot, we express k w t and k Inert t relative to their medians. Control variables are held …xed as we vary k w t and k Inert t . The …gure presents …tted values normalized such that the lines cross the orgin.
APPENDIX
A.1 Model with Internal Habit
The analysis in Section 2.1 can easily be extended to models with internal habit, where the habit depends on past consumption as in Constantinides (1990) in a continuoustime setting. Speci…cally, let the habit, X t , follow the di¤erence equation:
W t re ‡ects the excess wealth that is not needed to …nance future discounted habit, where the habit grows at a rate of b and depreciates at a rate of a. Note that the value of X t+1 is known at time t. Now assume that the investor at time t invests, after time t consumption, a fraction t of wealth in excess of
into the risky asset, and the rest in the riskless asset. This surplus portfolio yields a return R p;t+1 t (R t R f ) + R f . The remaining
dollars are invested in the riskless asset. The dynamic budget constraint becomes
Substituting in the de…nitions of surplus wealth and consumption and multiplying terms we get
Using the de…nition of C t the optimization problem now is
which is equivalent to
so the problem again maps into a power utility problem. The portfolio share now is
Approximating 1, as in the main text, we get
Log-linearizing and, in an abuse of notation, slightly changing our de…nitions to x t log(X t = (R f + a b)), w t log (W t C t ), we have t = 1 exp (x t+1 w t ) (A.10) (x t+1 w t ) ; (A.11) which implies
Note that x t+1 = log (X t+1 ) = log (1 + bC t aX t ). Therefore, as long as b and a are close to zero, which means that the habit reacts sluggishly to past consumption, we can approximate
as we do in Section 2.2. Of course, if the habit reacts faster, then it is possible that the e¤ects of x t+1 and w t o¤set, and our tests don't pick up the time-varying risk aversion induced by the habit. So our tests should be viewed as tests for low frequency movements in relative risk aversion.
A.2 Numerical Solution of a Model with Anticipated Income
To illustrate the e¤ects of anticipated income on portfolio choice, we numerically solve a three-period version of our model, in which the household receives, with some positive probability, a large payment (e.g., an inheritance) in the second period. The household starts with an initial wealth of W 0 = 50 in liquid assets and chooses consumption (C 1 , C 2 ) and the risky asset share ( 1 , 2 ) at time t = 1; 2. For simplicity, the household is assumed to have no labor income or other assets. At t = 3, the household is assumed to consume the entire remaining wealth. At t = 2, the household receives a payment B, with probability p B = 0:8. Hence, the expected value of this payment to the household at t = 1 is
We further set log (1 + R t ) N ( ; 2 ), log (1 + R f ) = 0:04, = 0:09, = 0:15, = 4, and = 0:9. We solve the model by backward induction using a standard approach. We …rst solve the second period problem as a function of beginning of second period wealth. For a given level of beginning of second period wealth (before second period consumption but after returns from the …rst to the second period are realized), we perform a grid search over values of C 2 and 2 to …nd the combination that maximizes expected utility, where we use numerical integration to evaluate expected utility. In this way we obtain maximized expected utility, i.e., the value function, as a function of beginning of second period wealth on a discretely spaced grid. We interpolate the value function between grid points and then solve the …rst period problem to obtain the optimal C 1 and 1 . Figure A .1 shows how consumption and the risky asset share chosen in the …rst period depend on the expected value of the second period payment. We consider values for B from 0 to 50, i.e., E 1 [B] ranges from 0 to 40. At the higher end of this range, the payment, if received, substantially raises the liquid assets of the household (compared with W 0 = 50), and this increase is largely anticipated since p B = 0:8-just like it might be the case for the typical inheritance. Panel (a) shows that the risky asset share of a household with habit (X = 10) does not signi…cantly increase as we increase B. Despite the fact that the household anticipates a substantial asset in ‡ow in the second period, this does not induce the household to increase the allocation to risky asset. The reason is-as we discuss in the main part of the paper-that the small, but non-negligible risk that B will be zero forces the household to still save enough in riskless assets to be able to self-insure future habit. A likely, but not entirely certain payment in the second period cannot be utilized for insuring future habit, and therefore does not signi…cantly increase the household's willingness to hold the risky asset. In fact, there is actually a small decline in the risky asset share with higher B. This e¤ect has to do with the household's consumption decision. As Panel (b) shows, and as one would expect, the anticipation of a large payment raises consumption in the …rst period, which in turn implies that less liquid assets are available to insure future habit, and so a higher proportion of those liquid assets must be invested in the riskless asset.
For comparison, Panels (a) and (b) also show the optimal consumption and risky asset share of a household without habit (X = 0). As one would expect, the promise of a large payment raises the willingness of a CRRA household to hold risky assets in the …rst period, because the risky in ‡ow in the second period provides some diversi…cation of the risk associated with the risky asset, akin to the e¤ect of risky, uncorrelated labor income.
Panels (c) and (d) plot 2 2 1 against the change in the log of liquid assets w 2 = w 2 w 1 , comparable to the variables that we measure in the empirical data, for several values of B. It is apparent that the risky asset share of a household with habit utility strongly responds to changes in the level of liquid assets (Panel (c)), while the risky asset share of a household with CRRA utility does not (Panel (d) ). Most importantly, with habit utility the relationship is almost identical, irrespective of whether changes in the level of liquid assets are unexpected (E 1 [B] = 0) or a large increase is anticipated (B = 50, E 1 [B] = 40). Overall, the results from this model support our intuitive argument in Section 2.2 of the paper that the e¤ects of unexpected and anticipated changes in liquid asset holdings on the risky asset share should be similar. A.3 Estimation in the Presence of Aggregate Shocks Chamberlain (1984) points out that when households are subject to common aggregate shocks, the fact that a model implies that the time-series average of shocks converges to zero as T ! 1 (a typical implication of rational expectations models), does not imply that the cross-sectional average must go to zero as the number of cross-sectional units N ! 1. If the shock is identical across the population, then including time dummies absorbs the common shock. But if di¤erent groups of households have di¤erent sensitivity to the common shock, there is again no guarantee that the time dummies eliminate the common shock. Hence, estimation with cross-sectional moments may lead to biased coe¢ cients. In our setting, however, this issue does not arise. To show this, we closely follow Deaton (1992) , p. 148. Assume that household i's log wealth is subject to an aggregate shock t with household-speci…c sensitivity (1 + i ) and an idiosyncratic shock (uncorrelated across households) it , so that
(A.14)
where the cross-sectional average of i is zero. Our model implies that the change in the risky asset share follows where the coe¢ cient on the aggregate shock is lower by the factor , because t implies a change in the aggregate demand for stocks which leads to a change in prices and expected returns, not to a change in the quantity of stocks held (holding the supply of stocks …xed). Now suppose we run a single cross-sectional regression, with intercept (i.e., a time dummy), of t on w it . It is easy to show that the OLS estimator for the slope coe¢ cient has the probability limit
where V ar (:) denotes the cross-sectional variance. Thus, we can consistently estimate by including time-dummies in our panel regressions. The reason that the Chamberlain (1984) problem does not arise in our setting is that dependent and explanatory variable are contemporaneous. As a consequence, the e¤ects of i t in the dependent and explanatory variable cancel out in numerator and denominator of plim b . In contrast, the examples discussed by Deaton (1992) , p. 146-148, are ones where consumption growth is regressed on lagged income growth.
One issue that may complicate things is if is also heterogeneous in the population and is correlated with i . Then it no longer drops out completely through the time dummy. With t as the LHS variable, should have some heterogeneity, because a given percentage change in stock prices due to the aggregate shock should have a bigger e¤ect for households with high t than for those with low t . However, we can also linearize Eq. (8) di¤erently so that log t is on the LHS. In that case, the e¤ect of a given percentage change in prices on log t would be the same for all households (assuming the composition of their risky asset portfolios is similar). We report regressions with log t in Table A .2 in this Appendix. They yield similar results compared with those that have t as the dependent variable, which suggests that heterogeneity in does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on our results.
A.4 Data: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
We now provide additional details about our data from the PSID and variable construction. Whenever possible, we use the Wealth Supplement Files and the Income Plus Files to construct our variables, and the Core Family Files otherwise. Annual sample sizes in the PSID range from 5,000 to 7,000, but they are signi…cantly reduced by the data availability requirements we impose.
In terms of timing, wealth data is reported as of the time the interview takes place (e.g., some time during 2003 in the 2003 wave), while income data refer to the calendar year preceding the date of the interview. Hence, the income and wealth data are not perfectly aligned, but for our tests this does not constitute a problem, because we focus on the relationship of di¤erent wealth variables which are all measured at the same date for a given household.
Riskless assets comprise the PSID categories cash (checking and savings accounts, money market funds, certi…cates of deposits, savings bonds, and treasury bills) plus bonds and life insurance (bonds, bond funds, cash value in a life insurance, valuable collection for investment purposes, and rights in a trust or estate). Risky liquid assets are de…ned as the amount reported in the PSID survey question asking for the combined value of shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, and investment trusts. In the PSID, subjects are asked to report securities holdings net of amounts owed on the position. Other debts comprise items such as credit card debt, student loans, medical or legal bills, and loans from relatives. Home equity is the value of the home minus remaining mortgage principal.
Before 1999, subjects were asked explicitly to include assets held in individual retirement accounts (IRA) when reporting their …nancial asset holdings. Since 1999, they are asked to exclude assets in employer-based pensions and IRAs. Instead, there is a separate question on the value of IRA assets and their allocation to di¤erent asset classes. Based on the answer to the latter question, we allocate the IRA assets to stocks and bonds. If subjects state "mostly stocks"we allocate 100% of the IRA value to stocks, if the answer is "split" we allocate 50% to stocks and 50% to bonds, if it says "mostly interest bearing"we put 100% to bonds.
When we use data on purchases and sales of risky assets to back out capital gains and losses, we need to make an assumption regarding the timing of investment. The reported investment could either have occurred early or late in the measurement period. We assume that half of it has been made at the beginning of the period, and half of it at the end. For IRA assets in 1999 , and 2003 we only have a combined active investment …gure for all IRA assets. As an approximation, we assume that new IRA funds are allocated pro rata among the prior holdings.
A.5 Robustness Checks
Correction for weak instruments-In our TSLS regressions, our instruments are highly signi…cant in the …rst-stage regression, but comparing the …rst stage F -statistic for the test that the coe¢ cients on the instruments are jointly zero with the results of Stock and Yogo (2005) nevertheless suggests that we cannot reject with high con…dence that the TSLS estimator could have some bias and the test statistics could have size distortions. For this reason, we re-run our tests with a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator and compute coverage-corrected con…dence intervals along the lines proposed by Moreira (2003) . Table ( A.1) presents the results. The point estimate shown is the LIML estimate and the coverage-corrected 95% con…dence interval is shown in brackets. In Speci…cation (1) the dependent variable is the change in the proportion of risky assets in liquid wealth, and in Speci…cation (2) the dependent variable is the change in the proportion of risky assets in …nancial wealth. Comparing the results with Tables 4 and 5, it is apparent that the LIML estimator produces results that are almost identical to those with the TSLS estimator. The only di¤erence is that the coverage-corrected con…dence intervals are slightly wider than the TSLS con…dence intervals based on the usual normal approximation. Overall, our TSLS results do not seem to be much a¤ected by a weak-instruments problem. Transformations of the risky asset share-In Section (2.2), we linearized the relationship between the risky asset share and liquid wealth. Our linearization is not the only way in which one could linearize the relationship. For example, one could linearize in such a way that the dependent variable on the left-hand size of Equation (9) is the k-period di¤erence of some transformation of the risky asset share. Here we consider the log and logit transformations and we check whether we obtain similar results if we use the k-period di¤erence in the log risky asset share (Speci…cation (1) in Table A .2) or logit risky asset share (Speci…cation (2) in Table A .2) as the dependent variable in our regressions. As the table shows, we still obtain a slighly negative coe¢ cient, as in Table 4 , between two and three standard errors from zero. In addition, Speci…cation (3) uses as the dependent variable a risky asset share that accounts for leverage. Instead of scaling stock holdings by the amount of liquid assets, we scale by liquid wealth (liquid assets minus non-mortgage debt, such as credit card debt, for example). As a result, the risky asset share can be bigger than one. Because there are some households with liquid wealth close to zero or negative at time t, we have to discard observations with negative liquid wealth and we winsorize values of the risky asset share above 2. In the main part of the paper, we scale by liquid assets to avoid such truncation and winsorizing, but as Table A .2 shows the OLS results are very similar when we scale by liquid wealth instead of liquid assets. The coe¢ cient on k log liquid wealth is signi…cantly negative in the 1984-1999 sample period. Only for Speci…cation (2) in the in the 1999-2003 subsample, the coe¢ cient is higher than in our basic Speci…cation in Table 4 . For all three Speci…cations in Table A .2 we also re-ran our TSLS regressions with the risky asset share transformations and obtained similar results. Overall, the results are not systematically di¤erent if we choose a di¤erent linearization or take into account leverage. One might suspect that the log transformation could have a stronger e¤ect on the regressions that use changes in the proportion of …nancial wealth invested in risky asset, because the …nancial wealth risky asset share has some negative skewness, with observations being somewhat concentrated close to one (see Table 1 ). However, as Table A .3 shows, the transformations make little di¤erence. The point estimates using the log transformation (Speci…cation 1) and the logit transformation (Speci…cation 2) are again negative, as in Table 5 . Note that the logit transformation yields a lower number of observations here, because it excludes households with more than 100% invested in risky assets. Recall that the denominator of the risky asset share in this case is …nancial wealth (unlike the liquid assets risky asset share, which has liquid assets, not liquid wealth, as the denominator), which can be smaller than the amount of risky …nancial assets. In summary, these tests con…rm that our results are robust to choosing a di¤erent linearization of our estimating equation.
Sampling weights-Our tests in the main part of the paper weight all observations equally (except for the summary statistics in Table 1 ), despite the fact that households with di¤erent characteristics have di¤erent sampling probabilities in the PSID. The reason is that our model should apply to all households. Hence, for estimating habit e¤ects it would be ine¢ cient to use sample weights (see, e.g., the discussion in Deaton (1997) , p. 70). If some household characteristics need to be controlled for, we do so by including them in the regression. But it turns out that we also obtain similar results if we weight households by the PSID sample weights, as shown in Table A .4. The results are almost identical to those in Table 4 . The same is true for the regressions with the proportion of …nancial wealth invested in risky assets (not tabulated).
LAD regressions-To check whether our results might be driven by outliers, we run least-absolute deviation (LAD) regressions (median regressions). The results are shown in Table A .5, with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. It is apparent that the estimates are virtually identical to our OLS estimates. Therefore, we conclude that our results are not driven by outliers. 
